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Abstract
In recent times, there has been an upsurge in ransomware
attacks, where an attacker encrypts a user’s files and
then demands a ransom in exchange for the decryption key. While paying the ransom allows the user to
quickly unlock the locked files and avoid potentially larger
losses, it also strengthens the hands of the attacker and
increases the chance of a future attack. We study this
dilemma of the victims and the externality posed by their
actions using a game-theoretic model on top of a Markov
decision process. The resulting equilibrium leads to several interesting insights such as that legally prohibiting
ransom payments may not always have the desired economic effects—in some cases, a ban may be effective
in addressing the economic externality but, in others, it
could reduce public welfare. Our findings have important
implications for policymakers who are currently debating
legislation that, if enacted, will outlaw ransom payments
to attackers.
Keywords: Ransomware, Markov decision process,
information security, externality, social cost.

1.

Introduction

Ransomware, a form of computer malware, has
quickly become one of the top cybersecurity threats
faced by today’s organizations. In the United States
alone, it has cost businesses and governmental institutions more than $7.5 billion in 2019 [3]. According
to the Federal Bureau of Investigations, nearly 1,500
cases were reported in 2018 and, on average, each
victim suffered a loss of an eye-popping $3.6 million [10, 13]. Clearly, ransomware, which used to be
a nuisance primarily to individual users, has hit the
big market and has started impacting us all, directly
or indirectly.
As apparent from the name itself, ransomware
seeks to make money through extortion. It spreads
primarily through phishing scams or by compromising unpatched systems, and once it successfully
infects a target, it starts encrypting files on the victim’s computer, files such as documents, images,
videos, and perhaps most importantly, transactional
databases. After encrypting a large number of such
files, it notifies the victim that his files have been
rendered inaccessible and that he must pay a ransom to recover the encrypted files. In other words,
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victims must pay for the decryption key, or else they
will face significant data loss and business disruption.1
Interestingly, victims, although unwilling to admit
so publicly, often end up paying substantial amounts
as ransom. For example, Travelex, a well-known
financial firm, has paid $2.3 million following a
breach in the late December of 2019 [12]. Only a couple of months earlier, DCH Health System, a medical center operator, paid an undisclosed sum to its
attackers [2]. In fact, it is quite common for companies to pay such ransoms in cryptocurrencies such as
Bitcoin [10], which makes the transactions and their
recipients quite difficult to track. Moreover, quite
often, perpetrators of such crimes operate from a
location that is outside of the legal reaches of the
nation to which the victim belongs.
The list of victims consists of not just private
enterprises; even governmental entities such as city,
town, and county governments have been compelled
to pay such ransoms. In Florida, for example, two
cities, Lake City and Riviera Beach, had to pay
$500,000 and $600,000 respectively, while Le Porte
County in Indiana paid $130,000. As of August 2019,
more than 70 state and local governments suffered
ransomware attacks, and many of them eventually
succumbed to the demands of attackers [14]. In the
rare cases that they refused, they were hit with a
much bigger loss and recovery cost; for example,
when the City of Atlanta, following a breach in
March 2018, refused to pay a $51,000 ransom, it
had to spend a whopping $17 million to rebuild its
systems [12]. In short order, the City of Baltimore
suffered a similar fate when it refused to comply
with a ransomware demand. Such worries for a much
larger loss have created a surreal scenario where city
councils, state governments, and even police departments are lining up after a breach to pay the ransom necessary to get their stuff back [8]. The lesson
1

Of course, there is no guarantee that the attacker would
honor its word upon receiving the ransom payment. As a
result, a victim firm may question in the first place the value of
acceding to the ransom demand. Such dilemma notwithstanding, the compelling reality of today is that a large number of
firms end up trusting the attacker and paying the ransom.
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is thus clear: paying a ransom is certainly not the
only option, but doing so is often the cheaper way
to restore and recover.2
However, with more frequent ransom payments
has risen the controversy surrounding them. The
reason is clear—there seems to exist an economic
externality involved in such payments. As organizations start paying their attackers, they also end
up encouraging these “bad” guys to come back for
more [9], amplifying in the process the risk of future
attacks on everyone, including themselves. According to Shi [14], “Ransom payments fuel the efforts
of the cybercriminals. Hackers use that money to
become more capable, commit more crimes, and
expand their operations.” Criticizing the shortsightedness of ransom-payers in this regard, Shi actually
calls for a legal prohibition on all such payments. Shi
is not alone in this demand. Outraged by increasingly large ransoms and an increased frequency of
attacks, many others are raising their voice in favor
of banning ransom payments altogether [15]. In fact,
some policymakers have already started to heed this
advice. For example, two bills have been introduced
in the New York State Senate to prohibit municipalities from paying ransomware attackers, one to
ban the practice of paying a ransom with taxpayer
dollars and the other to ban it entirely [11, 15].
In this backdrop, several questions arise naturally: Should policymakers indeed outlaw ransom
payments? Will doing so actually alleviate the situation, by trading off short-term benefits for a longterm gain? In other words, can a ban be effective
in addressing the economic externality involved in
ransom payments? These questions are not only relevant, but they are also unanswered.
The literature on economics of information
security has grown considerably in recent years,
with game-theoretic approaches gradually rising to
prominence [e.g., 4, 5]. Interestingly, the issue of
externality, which is highly relevant to this work,
has also caught the attention of economists [16].
Further, recognizing the importance of ransomware
and its broad implications, has emerged a new substream of research that focuses on the economics
of ransomware. Among the key works in this substream, August et al. [1] consider the perspective of
a software vendor, in particular how the underlying economic externalities affect the vendor’s pricing strategy. In contrast, Hernandez-Castro et al. [6]
2

Seals [13] tells an interesting story in this regard. A firm
called Proven Data Recovery was claiming to make use of
technology tools to clean up ransomware breaches. Secretly,
however, they were actually paying the ransom while collecting a premium from their clients.

examine the perspective of the ransomware attackers
and how price-discrimination strategies employed by
the attackers would impact social welfare. Laszka et
al.[7] investigate the decision of the potential victims
to invest in backup technologies and to what extent
such technologies can serve as a deterrent. Although
these papers examine important economic aspects
related to ransomware attacks, they do not specifically address the issue of whether or not a ban on
ransom payments can be economically beneficial in
the long run, an issue eminently central to this work.
We address the issue by setting up a multi-period
game involving two firms, where one firm’s decision
to pay a ransom in any period increases the probability of future attacks on both. The question we
then ask is how these firms would fare with or without a ban. Our answers happen to be interesting.
We find that, contrary to common wisdom, a ban
is effective in mitigating the economic externality
only in limited circumstances. Specifically, there are
only two situations when a ban might work: (i) when
there is an asymmetric equilibrium in which one firm
resists and the other accedes to the ransom demand,
(ii) when the multi-period game takes the form of a
prisoner’s dilemma, causing both firms to pay ransoms even when doing so is not mutually beneficial.
In all other cases, a ban on ransom payments could
be counterproductive. Policymakers, therefore, need
to be careful before they institute laws to prohibit
ransom payments.

2.

Model

To illustrate the effect of how firms may react to
ransomware attacks, we consider an infinite-horizon
multi-period model in which future payoffs are discounted appropriately. For simplicity, we consider
a game with two firms. At the beginning of each
period, each firm experiences a breach with a positive probability. If breached, a firm has two options.
It can make a ransom payment of r to the attacker
to quickly restore its normal operations or, alternatively, it can refuse to pay the ransom and lose
c ≥ r. This loss of c may result from business disruptions as well as costs incurred towards recovery.
Typically, ransoms provide firms a quick way out in
≥0
the short term, which is why c ≥ r. Let γ = c−r
r
be the normalized additional cost associated with
non-payment of ransom. It can also be viewed as the
loss ratio or the defiance premium—the larger the
loss ratio, the less likely is a firm to resist payment.
Even though γ ≥ 0 and it is less costly in the shortrun to simply accede to the ransom demand, it may
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not be the best policy from a long-term perspective, with respect to private profit or public welfare.
For, ransom payments can strengthen the hands of
the attacker by providing encouragement as well as
resources to orchestrate attacks and may, therefore,
result in a higher threat level in the future [14]:
Assumption 1. The breach probability faced by a
firm in any period t is βn = β(1 + nα) < 1, where
n ∈ {0, 1, 2} is the number of firms that paid ransom
in period t − 1, and α, β > 0 are model parameters.
Further, the event of a firm facing a breach is independent of other breaches.
The parameter α in Assumption 1 represents the
amplification fraction of the breach probability and
captures the externality effect within this context;
the higher the α, the larger is the risk a firm induces
on the other as well as on itself by complying with
a ransom demand. The parameter β, on the other
hand, represents the inherent risk within the context; it captures the fact that, even when the externality effect is absent, firms will continue to face
a residual level of risk. The last part of Assumption 1—stochastic independence of breach events—is
not critical; it simply makes the exposition clutterfree.
Assumption 1 tells us that each firm can be in one
of two states—breached (1) or safe (0)—in any given
period, and that the probability of being breached
in the next period depends on the total ransom payment to the attacker but not on the firm’s current
state. The state transition diagram for a firm can be
shown in Figure 1. To elaborate, if both firms are
breached in period t − 1 and they both decide to pay
a ransom in that period—that is, if n = 2—they both
risk a breach in period t with a probability of β2 =
β(1 + 2α). If only one of them pays a ransom while
the other one refuses, the attacker is less encouraged
and, accordingly, they both face a lower breach probability of β1 = β(1 + α) in the next period. Finally,
if neither pays any ransom, the breach probability is
just β0 = β in the next period. Thus, while the payment of a ransom increases the threat level in the
following period, the refusal to pay has the opposite
effect of retaining a lower threat level.
Since each firm can be in only one of the two
states, 0 or 1, one of the four states, {00, 01, 10, 11},
is possible in any period t. Let v00 denote the total
expected cost to firm 1 over the infinite time horizon
when neither firm experiences a breach in the current period. Likewise, we can define v10 to denote the
expected cost to firm 1 when only firm 1 experiences
a breach, v01 to denote the expected cost to firm 1

when only the second firm experiences a breach, and
v11 , when both firms experience a breach.
In general, firms may observe each other’s state
(breached or not breached), but they are unlikely to
observe each other’s actions (ransom paid or not).
Although firms do not enjoy telling the world that
they have experienced a breach, they usually end
up doing so to alert their customers, investors, and
other stakeholders.3 Even then, ransom payments
are done secretly, perhaps to avoid media and public scrutiny. Now, every period, in the event of a
breach, each firm chooses between: (P) pay a ransom and (N) do not pay any ransom. Therefore, the
strategy profile for the two firms can be denoted by
S = {(s1 , s2 )|s1 , s2 ∈ {P,N}}. In general, firms may
make their decisions simultaneously upon observing
their states in the beginning of each period. However, to keep the exposition straightforward, we consider only a static game in which each firm takes
the same action every period. Interestingly, all our
results extend to the situation in which firms make
their decisions in a dynamic fashion.
Let δ ∈ (0, 1) be the per-period discount factor,
implying that a dollar in the next period is worth
only δ dollars today. We are now ready to estimate a
firm’s expected cost in this Markov decision process.
We only estimate the expected cost for firm 1; that
for the other firm can be obtained from the symmetry of the problem.
We start with the case where there is no breach in
the current period. In that case, by definition, the
expected cost to firm 1 is v00 (s), s ∈ S. Since neither
incurring r nor c is necessary in this period, v00 (s)
is just the sum of costs incurred in the future, after
appropriate discounting is applied. Therefore, for all
s ∈ S, we can write:
v00 (s)= δV (0), where
V (n) = (1−βn )2 v00 (s) + βn (1−βn ) (v10 (s) + v01 (s))
+βn2 v11 (s). V (n) simply represents the expected cost
to firm 1 starting period t + 1 if n firms pay the
ransom in period t.
Similarly, when only firm 2 gets breached, but
firm 1 does not, we get:
(
δV (0), if s2 =N
v01 (s) =
δV (1), if s2 =P.
3

According to Neuhauser [8], most state and local governments have passed legislation on data-breach disclosure,
thereby requiring private companies to inform affected customers about a breach and also report the same to state
authorities.
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Figure 1. State Transition Diagram for a Firm

In contrast, if firm 1 is breached in the current
period, it will not only incur the future expected
cost, but it will also have to incur either r or c in
the current period depending on whether it adopts
N or P. Furthermore, firms’ strategy, s, should be
reflected in the breach probability, βn . Therefore, we
also get the following two relationships:
(
c + δV (0), if s1 =N
and
v10 (s) =
r + δV (1), if s1 =P,

c + δV (0), if s=(N,N)



c + δV (1), if s=(N,P),
v11 (s) =

r + δV (1), if s=(P,N),



r + δV (2), if s=(P,P).
Therefore, for a given s ∈ S, we have four simultaneous equations which can be solved for the four
unknowns. The results are summarized in Table 1.

3.

Equilibrium

Based on the incurred costs specified in Table 1,
we can now find out firm 1’s optimal strategy given
firm 2’s and vice versa. For ease of exposition, the
expected costs are arranged in the form of a cost
(payoff) matrix shown in Table 2; firm 1’s cost is the
first entry in each cell of this matrix. Now, it can be
shown from Table 1 that, regardless of the state x,
r
, or equivvx (N,N) ≤ vx (P,N) if and only if c ≤ 1−αβδ
αβδ
alently, γ ≤ 1−αβδ , γ1 . Furthermore, again regardless of the state x, vx (P,P) ≤ vx (N,P) if and only if
)
c ≥ r1(1−−αβδ
, that is, iff γ ≥ 1−αβδ
, γ2 . Clearly, γ2
2αβδ
2αβδ
is always greater than γ1 , so the following result is
immediate from Table 2:
Proposition 1. Not paying a ransom is the
dominant strategy if γ ≤ γ1 . Paying a ransom is the
dominant strategy if γ ≥ γ2 . In all other situations,
it is optimal to pay a ransom only if the other firm
does not.

Proposition 1 delineates the optimal strategy of
each firm and, hence, also the equilibrium. Specifically, if γ is sufficiently large (γ ≥ γ2 ), no firm wants
to pay c, and they both prefer paying r instead. As a
result, the equilibrium strategy is to play P in every
period. Exactly the opposite is true when γ is sufficiently low (γ ≤ γ1 ). In between γ1 and γ2 , however,
we have a situation where the payoff matrix resembles that of the so-called “game of chicken,” where
one firm playing P and the other playing N in each
period is an equilibrium. Formally:
Proposition 2. If γ ≤ γ1 , both firms playing N
in every period is the equilibrium. If γ ≥ γ2 , both
firms choosing P is the equilibrium. If γ1 < γ < γ2 ,
one firm playing P and the other choosing N is the
equilibrium.
Proposition 2 can be illustrated in Figure 2, where
the two thresholds, γ1 and γ2 , are plotted as a
function of the externality effect parameter, α,
thereby partitioning the entire (α, γ)-space into
three regions, two symmetric and an asymmetric one
nestled in between the two. Figure 1 clearly shows
that the (N,N) region expands with an increasing
α, as does the asymmetric region. In essence, when
the externality effect increases, so do the resistance
against paying ransom and the firms’ willingness to
tolerate a higher loss ratio.
It can be shown that the simplest approach of
sticking to the same strategy—either P or N—is sufficient in this game. Further, since action history of
the competitor is not observable, it is not possible
to devise a response that is contingent on actions
taken by the other firm in prior periods (such as
a “tit-for-tat” strategy). Overall, as c increases relative to r, we eventually transition from (N,N) to
(P,P) every period, but an asymmetric outcome is
eminently possible even in our symmetric setting at
moderate values of γ (γ1 < γ < γ2 ).
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Table 1. Net Present Total Cost to Firm 1 in Different States

s→

(N,N)

(N,P)

(P,N)

(P,P)

v00 (s)

cβδ
1−δ

cβδ
(1−δ)(1−αβδ)

rβδ
(1−δ)(1−αβδ)

rβδ
(1−δ)(1−2αβδ)

v01 (s)

cβδ
1−δ

cβδ(1+α(1−δ))
(1−δ)(1−αβδ)

rβδ
(1−δ)(1−αβδ)

rβδ(1+α(1−δ))
(1−δ)(1−2αβδ)

v10 (s)

c(1−δ(1−β))
1−δ

c(1−δ(1−β+αβ(1−δ)))
(1−δ)(1−αβδ)

r(1−δ(1−β))
(1−δ)(1−αβδ)

r(1−δ(1−β+αβ(1−δ)))
(1−δ)(1−2αβδ)

v11 (s)

c(1−δ(1−β))
1−δ

c(1−δ(1−β))
(1−δ)(1−αβδ)

r(1−δ(1−β))
(1−δ)(1−αβδ)

r(1−δ(1−β))
(1−δ)(1−2αβδ)

γ
1.0

(P,N)
or
(N,P)

(P,P)
0.5

γ2
γ1
(N,N)

0

0

1

2

3

4 α

Figure 2. Equilibrium Regions for β = 0.1 and δ = 0.9

Table 2. Cost Matrix For a Given State x ∈{00,01,10,11}

Firm 2

Firm 1

N

4.

P

N vx (N,N), vx (N,N) vx (N,P), vx (P,N)
P

vx (P,N), vx (N,P)

vx (P,P), vx (P,P)

Policy and Welfare

We now examine whether or not the equilibrium outcomes described in the preceding section are also the
first best, that is, if they are also optimal from a policymaker’s point of view. Specifically, can a ban on
ransom payments improve welfare and, if yes, under
what conditions? And, if a ban is not possible or
desirable, how else can a policymaker intervene to
counter this threat?
To be able to answer these questions, let us compare the total cost in equilibrium with what the firms
would have incurred together if ransom payments
were prohibited. Interestingly, the result of this com-

parison depends on where we start the game. For the
rest of the discussion, we will assume that, in the
beginning, neither firm experienced a breach, that
is, the game started with both being in the notbreached state in the first period. It is important
to note that the following analysis as well as any
insights obtained from it are robust qualitatively.
Our conclusions would be similar even if we were to
assume a different starting point—either 10, 01, or
11—instead of 00 assumed here.
To calculate the welfare, we only consider the costs
borne by the two firms; we exclude from the welfare
calculus the attacker and its gains. This is done for
two reasons. First, these attacks often originate in
other countries well beyond the jurisdiction of the
nation to which the victim belongs. It is unlikely that
a policymaker would be interested in counting any
gains by a foreign entity. Second, it is not clear that
the attacker would plow the extracted ransom back
into the economy in a productive way. For example, the ransom payments may actually provide the
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attacker with more resources to breach security in
the future, which can be detrimental to welfare.
When ransom payments are not banned, the
total cost incurred by the two firms in equilibrium,
denoted vT henceforth, can be written as:


if γ ≤ γ1 ,
2v00 (N,N),
vT = v00 (N,P) + v00 (P,N), if γ1 < γ < γ2 , (1)


2v00 (P,P),
otherwise.
In contrast, when ransom payments are completely
banned, the total cost would simply be 2v00 (N,N).
Comparing this with vT leads to the following result:
. Then, γ3 >
Proposition 3. Let γ3 = 1−2αβδ
2αβδ
γ2 > γ1 . Further, if γ1 < γ < γ3 , prohibiting ransom
payments improves welfare, i.e., 2v00 (N,N) < vT .
The result in Proposition 3 is best viewed in Figure 3, which partitions the (α, γ)-space into four
regions. In two of these regions, the (N,N) region
in its entirety and the portion of the (P,P) region
shaded gray, the market outcome is the same as
the first-best outcome, implying that the free market achieves the social optimum, and government
intervention is unwise. A complete ban on paying
ransom can, however, be the social optimum in the
other two regions: (i) the entire asymmetric region,
(P,N) or (N,P), where γ1 < γ < γ2 , and (ii) the portion of the (P,P) region shaded in red, γ2 ≤ γ < γ3 .
Notably, the ban works in slightly different ways in
the two regions. In region (ii), the ban benefits both
the firms, but in region (i), it hurts the ransom-payer
even as it improves the total welfare.
Recall that, when γ ≥ γ2 , both firms play P, i.e.,
pay a ransom of r in the event of a breach. They
do so because c is significantly high compared to r.
What Proposition 3 tell us is that, when γ ≥ γ3 , this
is indeed the most beneficial strategy for both firms.
However, when γ < γ3 , it is unfortunately not the
best for them to pay a ransom. Why do they then
pay a ransom when γ2 ≤ γ < γ3 ? The answer is simply that they face the classic “prisoner’s dilemma”—
even though (N,N) is the ideal spot for them to be
in, absent any coordination, implicit or explicit, they
are unable to reach that point, and they end up settling for an equilibrium that is actually not in their
interest. Note that the fact that they cannot observe
each other’s actions makes any coordination through
a tit-for-tat strategy practically impossible. Therefore, they remain locked in a prisoner’s dilemma,
which, although an equilibrium, is certainly not in
their interest. If ransoms are outlawed, they will
both gain in such a situation. The lessons for a policymaker is quite apparent. Banning ransoms can

be futile if γ is very large (γ ≥ γ3 ), but such a policy should definitely be a consideration when firms
remain locked in a prisoner’s dilemma.
There is another lesson, which is that asymmetric
outcomes are never socially beneficial. Banning ransom payments is always a good idea in such cases as
well. However, a policy maker needs to be mindful
that, in this case, the ban does not uniformly impact
both firms. One firm, the one that pays ransom, will
be hurt, while the other one that does not pay will
gain. Collectively, though, the welfare increases.
Finally, when γ ≤ γ1 , the situation from a welfare
perspective is actually similar to what happens when
γ ≥ γ3 —in both cases, the equilibrium strategy turns
out to be the most beneficial. Therefore, it is only
when γ is between γ1 and γ3 that the equilibrium
diverges from what is socially optimal.

5.

Discussion

Current US law criminalizes extortion—receiving,
possessing, or disposing of money that at any time
has been delivered as ransom—but there is no generally applicable law prohibiting individuals or organizations from making such payments, except when
such payments are being made to sanctioned entities such as terrorists. The question is thus simple. Should we enact new laws banning ransom payments in this era of grave cybersecurity threats?
Although it may appear from our results that banning ransom may appear socially desirable in certain
cases—specifically, when γ1 < γ < γ3 —simply outlawing ransom payment could be a heavy-handed
and often an undesirable way for the policymaker to
intervene. Here is why.
First, in a significant portion of the region—
specifically, when γ ≤ γ1 —such an intervention is
completely unnecessary. This is because firms are
unlikely to pay the ransom in this region, irrespective of whether or not such a ban exists. The fact
that this region expands as α, the externality parameter, increases tells us that, to an extent, the market can self-regulate itself and government intervention is essentially of no value. Furthermore, in the
region where γ ≥ γ3 , banning ransom would result in
an outcome that is socially suboptimal, so a ban is
detrimental in that portion of the parameter space
as well.
Therefore, we are left with only a narrow strip of
the parameter space (γ1 < γ < γ3 ) where a ban may
potentially be of some value. However, even then, a
ban could be an excessive measure. The fact remains
that a firm’s c, and hence its γ, is private information unknown to the policymaker. To complicate
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γ
1.0
(P,P)
First-Best
(P,P)

(P,N)
or
(N,P)

γ3
0.5

γ2
γ1

0

0

1

2

(N,N)
First-Best

3

4 α

Figure 3. Equilibrium and First-Best Regions for β = 0.1 and δ = 0.9

things further, based on investment in technology, a
firm’s γ could also change over time. Although such
changes are outside the scope of the model, it is difficult to accept that a government can truly ascertain
whether the current context indeed falls within this
externality strip of γ1 < γ < γ3 . Therefore, if the policymaker indeed takes the draconian step of banning
all ransom payments for good, an unintended consequence of such a step could be an overall loss in
social welfare. Finally, we must not forget that it is
much easier to pass a law against ransom payments
than to actually enforce it. For, it is often difficult
to track these payments—large ransom payments
are often broken into several smaller ones, are made
using cryptocurrencies, and are routed through different accounts, with the money making multiple
hops before finding its way to the attacker [13].
Therefore, if payments are outlawed, a firm facing a
dire consequence may resort to illegal transactions,
which could be difficult for a government to track
and prosecute, making the underlying law ineffective in the process. In summary, a law prohibiting
all ransom payments could be an overkill and should
perhaps be avoided.
Now, even if a complete ban is not desirable, is it
still possible for the policymaker to intervene? And,
can it act in a way that eventually incentivizes firms
so that they refrain from complying with ransom
demands? The short answer is yes; it can. This the
policymaker can do by reducing γ and bringing the
context to the green (N,N) region in Figure 3.
How can the policymaker reduce γ? Recall that
can be decreased either by decreasing c or by
γ = c−r
r

increasing r. Therefore, the policymaker can reduce
γ at once by partially bailing out firms who refuse
to pay the ransom. If necessary, the policymaker can
tie such bailouts to a precondition that a firm can
receive a bailout only once and the firm receiving the
governmental aid must invest a certain portion of
the aid towards more sophisticated recovery systems
and better security education of its employees. This
way, the firms can be incentivized to not accede to
ransom demands and to reduce the externality effect
it imposes on other firms.
Corporate bailout is not necessarily the only strategy the policymaker can adopt. It can also tax
the ransom payments themselves, thereby effectively
increasing the r that a firm must pay. Of course,
implementing a tax can still be a challenge. As mentioned earlier, ransom payments are typically done
in a manner that is difficult for the government to
track [13].
Interestingly, these two approaches are not mutually exclusive, and the policymaker can implement
both, that is, it can tax ransom payments and, at
the same time, provide aids to firms for refusing to
comply with ransom demands. This way, by a judicious mix of tax and subsidy, the policymaker can
not only stop ransom payments effectively, but it can
also do so in a somewhat revenue-neutral manner.

6.

Conclusion

Ransomware attacks are becoming more and more
frequent these days, and, at the same time, there has
also been a steady increase in the amount demanded
as ransom. Since refusing to pay can become very
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costly, the victim often ends up paying the ransom. However, such an action by an individual firm
has an externality. By paying the ransom, the firm
essentially strengthens the hand of the attacker,
which in turn increases the intensity of such attacks
in the future. Within this context, we wanted to
study whether the market can adequately address
this externality and, in case the market fails to fully
internalize it, how a policymaker should intervene.
We found that, although a complete ban on ransom payments could be an overkill, the policymaker
can indeed push victims towards non-payment by
adopting suitable subsidies and/or taxes. Of course,
our results should not be taken to mean that we are
suggesting that policymakers all over should immediately try to intervene. Our implications, if any,
are that a policymaker must pause and consider the
unintended consequences carefully before intervening. And, if there must be an intervention, it should
not be draconian.
In fact, policymakers cannot be faulted if they
decide to not intervene, leaving the market to itself
even within the externality region (γ2 < γ < γ3 ).
By not intervening, a policymaker could see, to the
detriment of public welfare, a growth in such attacks
in the short term, but the long-term consequences
could actually be quite desirable. This is because,
as the saying goes, once bitten twice shy! When the
threat of such attacks grows in the short run, individual firms would have all the incentives necessary
for them to invest in sophisticated backup and recovery technology that can restore its critical business
functions quickly and cheaply, making c go down
drastically. As more and more firms adopt proper
recovery technology, γ is likely to go down, pushing
the firms towards the green (N,N) region in Figure 3.
Therefore, the market may be able to address this
externality in the long run, even though there could
be some short-term blues.
Our work has a few limitations. In order to keep
the analysis simple, we only consider a static policy of P or N, throughout the time horizon. A
more general case would be where firms can dynamically change their ransom-payment behavior from
one period to the next depending on the state that
they are actually in. Our preliminary analyses indicate that there is no material impact on our results,
insights, and conclusions when a dynamic policy is
adopted. However, a formal treatment is necessary
before we can truly generalize the results. Also, our
setup considers only two firms; for the results to be
useful, they must extend to any number of firms.
Finally, we assume that the breach probability, β,

is static and exogenous. However, this probability
may change as firms invest more in IT security. We
are working on these issues to get a more complete
picture of the economic incentives that underlie this
important context.
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